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Mullett: Mullett: Lord Mansfield and English Dissenters

LORD MANSFIELD AND ENGLISH
DISSENTERS
CHARLES F. MULLETT*

Of all the men to whom English religious dissenters owed a debt of
gratitude for the improvement in their status during the eighteenth century,
none surpassed Lord Mansfield, the Tory Lord Chief Justice. Undoubtedly
many less famous judges contributed no small bit to the dissenters' relief
by their humane interpretation of the law; mention likewise has often
properly been made of those statesmen who, whatever their purpose, by
their persistent efforts secured the repeal of penal statutes; and a great
deal of respect should be paid to the many private citizens, anonymous or
not, who by their votes and their influence showed their disapproval of the
burdens under which the dissenters suffered. But, after all credit has been
given to these people, the claim of Lord Mansfield to especial attention is
scarcely to be challenged. His contributions to this aspect of religious
liberty in a measure comprehended that of all these other groups. His
judgments rendered nonconformity no crime; he spoke and worked for legislative relief; he openly disapproved of penal burdens. More than this,
however, his judicial opinions supplied lesser men with ammunition, and
because of their magnificent rhetoric these opinions had hardly less value
as tracts for the times than as the authoritative words of the leading
judicial oracle of the day. They gave heart to the dissenters and weight
to the reformers.
During Mansfield's public career a number of cases arose which gave
him the opportunity not only to give legal aid to dissenters, but also to
state principles concerning human rights, not the intangible "rights" of
nature, but the positive rights of English citizens. What made Mansfield's
contribution the more notable was the fact that he did not belong to the
political party which so often stressed its interest in liberty, nor was he himself always regarded as the champion of personal rights. During the debates
on the power of Parliament over the colonies in America, he was conspicuous
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even in a party which consistently opposed the claims of the colonists to
self-government of whatsoever degree. In fact, he was obviously the butt
of the remarks made by the great Lord Chatham when that noble gentleman preened himself as one who was no slave to dog-eared law books and
who placed persons before precedents. Yet when the struggles for an
improved status for Dissenters were being fought, the liberty-loving defender
of the colonists in America made no such beneficial contribution as his "reactionary" opponent.'
Before tracing Mansfield's contributions to the cause of religious liberty,
some attention may be given to his reputation and to his general position in
the history of English law. One of his early editors described him as possessing a mind in which the "most exalted talents were improved by the most
extensive cultivation" and declared that his distinct and accurate investigations had contributed "not less than the excellent Commentaries of Sir William Blackstone, to display the title of the English law to the rank of a
connected and elegant science.'2 Another writer has called him not only
the greatest common law judge, but the greatest judge in Anglo-American
legal history.' Joseph Story, who attempted to duplicate his work in
America, praised Mansfield for breaking down the "narrow barrier of the
common law" and for redeeming it from "feudal selfishness and barbarity,"
and described him as the "jurist of the commercial world" whose career was
an epoch in English judicial history.4
To be sure, not all commentators regarded him so favorably, although
they did not deny his ability and influence. Both his personality and his

1. Chatham, however, did speak "very warmly and spiritedly" in favor of a
bill for the relief of protestant dissenters in 1772, making the bill a peg on which to
hang a defense of toleration. 17 COBBET-, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY (1813) 440-41.
2. 1 WILLIAM D. EVANS, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE DECISIONS OF LORD MANSFIELD IN CIVIL CAUSES (1803) iv. In 1 BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON (1924) 443-44,
there is an informing dialogue. After Boswell declared that Mansfield, like Bacon,
Selden and Hale, was not a "mere lawyer", Johnson rejoined: "No, Sir. I never was
in Lord Mansfield's company; but Lord Mansfield was distinguished at the University. Lord Mansfield, when he first came to town, 'drank champagne with the
wits', as Prior says." Johnson would not "allow Scotland to derive any credit from
Lord Mansfield; for he was educated in England. 'Much (said he,) may be made
of a Scotchman, if he be caught young'." Ibid. 469. For the main facts of Mansfield's life, see 3 LORD CAMPBELL, LIVEs OF THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICES (1874) 194493. Mansfield, incidentally, was "sincerely attached" to Episcopalianism. His
tolerant attitude had no roots in any experience as a victim of religious persecution.
The son of a Jacobite, he might easily have been a religious bigot.
3. H. E. WILLIS, ANGLo-AMERICAN LAW (1926) 153.
4. STORY, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS (1835) 261-62.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss1/9
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politics aroused hostility. He impressed many people as overbearing and
egotistical, and as one who believed a little too whole-heartedly the essence of
what W. S. Gilbert's Lord Chancellor was to sing a century later:
The law is the true embodiment
Of everything that's excellent:
It has no kind of fault or flaw;
And I, my lords, embody the law.
Thomas Jefferson, who saw danger both in the "sly poison" of Mansfield's
law and in the "honeyed Mansfieldism" of Blackstone's Commentaries,
described Mansfield as "a man of the clearest head and most seducing
eloquence." 5 Jeremy Bentham, whose attack on Blackstone was said to
have delighted Mansfield, called the latter "a rank and intolerant Tory.",,
And John Quincy Adams in 1829 believed Mansfield to have been more
7
responsible for the American Revolution than any other man.
Nevertheless, while political writers have been mainly impressed with
Mansfield's political conservatism and while their ideas have usually prevailed upon historians, there is clearly another side. Although as a politician
he opposed every concession to the American colonists and favored policies
destined to compel their complete subservience or, as it turned out, their
rebellion; as a lawyer he was instrumental in bringing into English law
principles that characterize him as a liberal jurist both as to substance and
as to procedure. This paradox appears the greater when it is recalled that
commercial matters supplied the casus belli for the American Revolution
and at the same time gave Mansfield an opportunity to achieve rank as the
enlightened "jurist of the commercial world."
By his deliberate infusion of English common law with the law merchant,
Mansfield no less than Adam Smith paved the way for a "salutary revolution" in the realm of commerce; he enabled English law to keep up with social
and economic changes. Through his influence English business men did not
have to wait upon parliamentary statutes. Moreover, what Mansfield accomplished in this realm as an architect of the law, he did deliberately. "Precedents," he declared, "only serve to illustrate principles, and to give them
a fixed authority. But the law of England, which is exclusive of positive law
enacted by statute, depends on principles; and these principles run through

5.

4 JEFFERSON, WRITINGS

(Ford ed.) 479.

6. 10 BENTHAM, WORKS (Bowring ed.) 121.
7. 2 W. W. STORY, LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH

STORY
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all the cases, according as the particular circumstances of each have been
found to fall within the one or other of them."" And his favorite maxim
was, Boni judicis est ampliare justitiam.
If his application of this apothegm was a little tainted in the matter
of slavery in England, 9 his contributions to the cause of religious liberty
appear under no cloud. The "great Ultra-Tory" of Bentham and the American revolutionists gives way to an apostle of toleration no less ardent and
eloquent and certainly more influential than the most confirmed radicals of
his day. In a series of critical cases he delivered telling blows both at legislation and at judicial precedents which had sought and secured penalties
for religious dissent. More than any other one man he relieved dissenters of
the stigma of criminality.
Evidence that Mansfield's efforts in behalf of the dissenters did not go
unappreciated is to be found in the writings of Dr. Philip Furneaux, a
leading nonconformist advocate of greater religious liberty. In 1771, Furneaux addressed a series of Letters to Blackstone concerning that gentleman's
exposition of the Toleration Act and the position of nonconformists, in the
hope of inducing him to reconsider some passages in the Commentaries."
In answer to Blackstone's definition of nonconformity as a crime, Furneaux
offered ardent denial, saying that the ruling in the case of Harrisonv. Evans
(a case discussed later) conceded that the Toleration Act removed the
crime as well as the penalties of nonconformity. As an appendix to the
second edition of this tract Furneaux printed the details of the case,
extracts from the decisions of the judges, and Mansfield's speech on the case
in the Lords. It was from the last that he got most of the ammunition for
his attack on Blackstone.
Two years later Furneaux again entered the lists to fight for the
"rights" of Protestant Dissenters. His Essay on Toleration, a somewhat

8. Jones v. Randall, 1 Cowp. 37 (1774).
9. See E. C. P. LASCELLES, GRANVILLE SHARP AND THE FREEDOM OF THE
SLAVES IN ENGLAND (1928) c. iv. This author, who erroneously believes that Mansfield's mind "was filled with an almost idolatrous reverence for English law," sustains
the view that Mansfield had no wish to come to a decision on the position of slaves
in England, but was actually forced to do so by the illustrious abolitionist, Granville Sharp. For the case of Somersett, which involved this issue, see 20 HOWELL,
STATE TRIALS (1814) 1.
10. FURNEAUX, LETTERS TO THE HONORABLE MR. JUSTICE BLACKSTONE, CONCERNING, His EXPOSITION OF THE ACT OF TOLERATION, AND SOME POSITIONS RELATIVE TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, IN His CELEBRATED COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND

(2D ED.

1771).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss1/9
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more formal and philosophic piece than his earlier Letters, was dedicated to
Mansfield and contained some fertile generalizations from the noble lord's
speech printed in the earlier tract. 1 The immediate occasion for this tract
was the effort of the Protestant dissenters to secure statutory relief, an
effort which, needless to say, failed. Failure, however, did not bring cessation of effort, and another prominent dissenter in pleading for toleration
substantiated his claim on the ground that Mansfield, along with Camden,
had supported the bill.' 2 Finally, a few years later, Capel Lofft in his defense

of toleration quoted Mansfield on the non-criminality of religious dissent."'
Such references indicate that the leaders of the nonconformists did not find
Mansfield an "ultra-Tory" when religious freedom was involved.
The cases in which Mansfield expressed his sympathy for religious
toleration were few in number but they possessed great importance in that
his opinions carried the day and once and for all established precedents in
favor of the dissenters. Time and again in later years judges referred to
Mansfield's decisions as the basis for their own judgments in the same
direction.
The first dispute of which we have record that gave Mansfield an opportunity to speak in behalf of religious liberty was one not involving English
citizens at all but Mansfield, then Solicitor-general Murray, foreshadowed his
later opinions rather clearly. The case of Omichund v. Barker,'4 which was
decided in 1744, was partly concerned with the right of a "heathen" to be
received as a witness. Murray spoke forcefully and convincingly in favor of
the right, maintaining in general that if one did business with "heathens,"
one could not deny them legal rights even though their religious opinions
differed from those of the Church of England. Needless to say the evidence
was admitted.

11. FURNEAUX, AN ESSAY ON TOLERATION WITH A PARTICULAR VIEW TO THE
LATE APPLICATION OF THE PROTESTANT DISSENTING MINISTERS TO PARLIAMENT
FOR AMENDING, AND RENDERING EFFECTUAL, THE ACT OF THE FIRST OF WILLIAM
AND MARY, COMMONLY CALLED THE ACT oF TOLERATION (1773).
12.

SAMUEL STENNETT,

A

FREE AND DISPASSIONATE

APPLICATION OF THE PROTESTANT
LETTER TO A FRIEND (1772) 30-31.

Mansfield and Camden agreed.

790-91.
13.

AccouNT OF THE LATE

DISSENTING MINISTERS TO PARLIAMENT.

IN

A

This must have been one of the few times when
See 17 COBBETT, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY (1813)

LOFFT, THE RIGHT OF PROTESTANT DISSENTERS TO A COMPLEAT TOLERA-

TION ASSERTED (1789).

14. 1 Atk. 21 (1744).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937
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More pertinent to the general theme of this paper because dealing with
English citizens exclusively was the case of Crawford v. Powell decided in
1760.'5 The facts were simple and the issue occurred frequently. Crawford
had been duly elected town-clerk of Harwick in 1758, but Powell refused
to turn over "the common seal, books, papers and records of the Corporation," whereupon Crawford secured a mandamus directed to Powell commanding him to deliver the records to Crawford. Powell returned that
Crawford had not been duly elected and in the trial it had been twice argued
that the plaintiff ought to prove that he had taken the sacrament according
to the rites of the Church of England within a year next before his election, in
order to qualify for the office under the Corporation Act of 1661.16 That act
stated that no person could be elected into the office of townclerk of a corporation, that had not within one year next before such election taken the
Sacrament of the Lord's Supper according to the rites of the Church of
England; and in default thereof, every such election was thereby declared
void. The plaintiff's failure to prove his having taken the sacrament within
the prescribed time was described by Powell's attorneys as a "fatal objection."
Moreover, they reminded the court that under the "Act for Quieting
and Establishing Corporations,"' 7 no person thereafter to be elected into such
office shall "be removed by the corporation or otherwise prosecuted for or
by reason of such omission; nor shall any incapacity, disability, forfeiture or
penalty, be incurred by reason of the same, unless such person be so removed,
or such prosecution be commenced within six months after such person's
being placed or elected into his respective office." Since the plaintiff's
election had been protested within six months, it appeared "equally fatal"
to his case. A return of "non fuit electus" on the grounds of incapacity
and disability but not made until after the expiration of six months would
have been a false return and the plaintiff had no need to prove his having
taken the sacrament within a year, but this return was a true return having
been made within the allotted time.

15. 2 Burr. 1013 (1760).
16. 13 CHAS. II, stat. ii, c. I.
17. 5 GEO. I. c. 6 (1718). This act also provided that all Corporation officeholders who had failed to take the sacrament were to be "indemnified, freed and
discharged" of all penalties arising from such omission; and it likewise repealed the
parts of the original Corporation Act (1661) which required the office-holder to
take an oath against taking up arms against the king, and to declare against the
Presbyterian Solemn League and Covenant.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss1/9
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"But the Court (notwithstanding all this plausible reasoning),"
which involved also some very favorable precedents, "over-ruled the objection, and gave judgment for the plaintiff." Mansfield took the stand that
under the statute just mentioned, "the election of a person who had not
taken the sacrament within a year next preceding it, is not void, but only
voidable in case of a removal or prosecution within the time thereby limited:
and consequently, as here was no such removal or prosecution within that
limited time, the plaintiff's election stood confirmed and became absolute."
He believed that the objection had no force and that at least one of the precedents upon which the defendant had depended did not apply in this issue.
In delivering this judgment Mansfield very clearly interpreted the law to
favor the dissenter. By virtue of the fact that Crawford had not actually
been removed, and that although Powell had made return to the mandamus
within six months he did not actually prosecute Crawford, Mansfield was
able to apply the Georgian statute to the nullification of the Caroline
requirement.
Two years later Mansfield gave judgment in a case of somewhat broader
import and in words that conveyed his philosophic sympathy with religious
toleration. Rex v. Barker8 revolved around a mandamus requiring trustees
to admit a dissenting teacher, Christopher Mends, to the use of the pulpit
of a presbyterian meeting-house, he having been duly elected according to
the terms of the deed by the members of the congregation. The trustees,
however, controverted the election of Mends and supported a Mr. Hanmer,
whom they put in possession and endeavored to maintain "with a high
hand." The contest had aroused great animosity, and the counsel for the
trustees argued against the mandamus to admit Mends on the ground that
Hanmer was already in possession, and that such a mandamus went no
further than to give a legal possession where otherwise the party would
be without remedy, distinguishing in this instance between a mandamus to
admit and a mandamus to restore. Since Mends had never been in possession and his title was not legal but only equitable it was further argued that
this Court had no jurisdiction.
Mansfield, however, declared a mandamus to be a prerogative writ to
apply where a person is kept out of possession or is dispossessed of his right
to execute an office and "to be used upon all occasions where the law has
established no specific remedy, and where in justice and good government
18.

3 Burr. 1265 (1762).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937
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there ought to be one." Pointing out that this writ had been "liberally
interposed" within the last century "for the benefit of the subject and the
advancement of justice," he went on to maintain that since the Toleration
Act, "it ought to be extended to protect an endowed pastor of Protestant
Dissenters; from analagy and the reason of the thing." Mr. Justice Wilmot
sustained Mansfield's concept of a mandamus and Mr. Justice Foster,
scarcely less ready than Mansfield to give aid to dissenters, supported
Mansfield by affirming, "Here is a legal right. Their ministers are tolerated
and allowed: their right is established, therefore is a legal right, and as much
as any other legal right."
Mansfield then ordered the trustees to show cause why a writ of
mandamus should not issue, directed to them, requiring them to admit
Christopher Mends to the use of the pulpit in a certain meeting-house
appointed for the religious worship of Protestant Dissenters commonly called
Presbyterians, and to acquaint the Court as to whether they insisted on
the validity of Hanmer's election and whether they were willing to have
a new election. It was further asked that Hanmer be given notice of
the order so that he might be heard and so that he might acquaint the
Court whether he insisted on the validity of his election and whether he was
willing to have it tried in a "feigned issue." As might be expected the
trustees' counsel opposed the mandamus and insisted upon the validity
of Hanmer's election, their unwillingness to have a new election, Hanmer's
conviction of the validity of his election, and his unwillingness to have it
tried in a "feigned issue."
Nevertheless the Court, having considered the matter fully, favored the
granting of a mandamus, neglecting, for reasons which do not appear in
the case, the fact that the election of Mends was liable to objections on the
ground of nonqualification under the Toleration Act. "To deny this writ,"
said Mansfield, "would be putting Protestant Dissenters and their religious
worship, out of the protection of the law. This case is intitled to that protection; and can not have it in any other mode, than by granting this writ."
Nothwithstanding these rather obvious efforts to extend the protection
of the Courts to Protestant Dissenters, Mansfield did not always give judgment on that side, as the unimportant case of Rex v. Wrougltton, Esq. and
Others, decided in 1765, reveals.19 Here a rector of the Church of England,
Townshend by name, being a "well-wisher to the Methodists," had admitted
one of the sect to his pulpit. Wroughton, a local justice of the peace, "strenu19. 3 Burr. 1683 (1765).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss1/9
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ously opposed" this admission, and afterwards Townshend attempted to
secure an information against him for a misdemeanor in obstructing divine
service and grossly insulting the rector. Mansfield declared against the
Court's interposing in the matter on the grounds that Townshend had "suppressed truth" and had misrepresented the case, that the Methodist had no
license from the bishop of the diocese as was required, and that the bishop
had actually instructed Wroughton to see that "the general and usual
course of celebrating divine service in the Established Church" was complied
with and that no unlicensed preacher should preach in this particular church.
Mansfield did take occasion to state, however, that he would have it understood, in general, that Methodists had a right to "the protection of this
Court, if interrupted in their decent and quiet devotion: and so had "dissenters from the Established Church likewise, if so disturbed." But since
Mr. Townshend was not in this position and had defied and disobeyed the
bishop who had the right to license all who preached in his diocese, he had
no claim to protection from the Court.
Another rather unimportant case involving Methodists but at the same
time having reference to religious dissent came up in 1766 under the title,
Rex v. Justices and Clerk of the Peace for the County of Derby.2' The
defendants attempted to show cause why a mandamus should not issue to
oblige them to certify and register a dissenting meeting-house. Their counsel
stated that the parties certifying had not shown what species of Protestant
dissenters they were "so as to entitle themselves to the indulgence shewn
by the Toleration Act; which only meant to give ease to tender consciences,
when professing such principles, as neither endanger the civil government,
nor undermine the fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion." The
counsel further declared that the dissenters had not specified in what points
they dissented and indeed might be Socinians. Supposing them only Methodists, "which was the fact," there was the serious question as to whether
they came within the Toleration Act since they did not dissent from the
Church of England. It was further objected that the house was not proper
to be registered since the parties applying were not of the neighborhood and
by Regina v. Peach,2 1 early in the reign of Anne it was held that a dissenting
20. 4 Burr. 1991; 1 Bla. W. 606 (1766).
21. 2 Salk. 572 (1705). In 6 Mod. 228, it is given at greater length under the
title of Peat's Case. By the statute of 10 ANNE, c. 3, §9, however, if a dissenting
minister were qualified according to the Toleration Act he might officiate in any
congregation, provided the meeting-house had been properly registered and a certificate of his qualifications had been left with the clerk of the peace of the county
where he qualified.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937
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minister who had qualified in one county could not officiate in another.
Since also a meeting-house when registered acquired some privileges and it
became a felony to demolish it, persons living out of the neighborhood might
not certify it and thereby give it those privileges. Finally, the persons certifying the meeting-house had not brought themselves within the terms of
the Toleration Act by taking the oaths and making the declaration. In
spite of these weighty reasons Lord Mansfield held that "no inconvenience
can attend the registering of this meeting-house" and that in performing that
rite the action of the justices was "merely ministerial." He likewise declared
that the registry and certificate did not prove the persons applying for
registration to be within the act. They would still have to show that they
had satisfied the required qualifications if called upon. If they were within
the Toleration Act, the mere registering of their meeting-house would not
protect them from the penalties of the law. Regardless of these qualifying
warnings, however, Mansfield did grant the mandamus and thus again
displayed his willingness to aid dissenters.
The following year a long dispute drew to a close and Mansfield provided
the clinching arguments in phrases that heartened many a dissenting
advocate of greater religious and political liberty. The case of Harrison v.
Evans22 had its origin in a London by-law which imposed a heavy fine on
those who refused the office of sheriff. Although by the terms of the Corporation Act no dissenter could serve the office, many were nominated and
elected and paid the fines for not serving. When some refused to pay the
fines the corporation brought action in the Sheriff's Court to recover the
fines. In 1757, in the case of Allen Evans, that Court gave judgment to the
plaintiff. Evans then carried an appeal to the Court of Hustings which
affirmed the earlier judgment. On a writ of error Evans appealed to the
Court of Judges Advocates which in 1762 unanimously reversed the earlier
judgments. This time, the corporation by writ of error brought the case
before the House of Lords where judgment again was given to Evans. On
this occasion Mansfield delivered a magnificent speech in behalf of the dis23
senters which once and for all denied their criminality.

22. Wilm. 130 (1762); 2 BURNS, ECCLESIASTICAL LAW (8th ed.) 207; FUR(1771) 257-83; 16 COBBE'rT, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY (1813) 31327. See also the present writer's article, The Corporation Act and the Election of
English ProtestantDissenters to Corporation Offices (1935) 21 VA. L. REv. 641-64,
for a sketch of this problem.
23. 16 CoBBErr, PARLIAMENTARY HIsToRY (1813) 313-27.
NEAUX, LErERs

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss1/9
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He began by explaining that he had moved for the opinion of the
judges in the Lords in order that the House might have the benefit of expert
assistance and also in order that in future cases of like nature, the House
would know how to decide. Thereupon he moved with his most characteristically "seducing eloquence" into a lengthy disquisition upon the principles
as well as upon the law involved, premising that the action of the corporation
in inflicting a penalty on those who declined the office of sheriff could not be
supported. If, he said, the city relies on the Corporation Act which forbade
the election of a person who had not satisfied the sacramental test, then
the defendant (Evans) was not elected and the case against him failed. If,
moreover, the city grounded its action on the design of the legislature, in
passing the Corporation Act, of keeping dissenters out of office, then Evans
being a dissenter, and, in the eye of the law, a dangerous, ill-affected person,
was excluded from office and disabled from serving. If, again, the city
based its action on its own by-law, of which the express purpose was to
secure fit and able persons to serve the office, then Evans not being fit and
able under the terms of the Corporation Act was not punishable for his
refusal. Finally, if the city grounded its case on the defendant's neglect
of taking the sacrament, it should be remembered that the Toleration Act
had freed dissenters from that obligation and therefore the defendant had
not been guilty of criminal neglect.
Thereupon Mansfield turned to consider the Corporation Act itself
and the intent of the legislators in passing it, which was simply to keep
disaffected persons out of power. Therefore, they had put it out of the power
of the electors to choose such persons as well as out of those persons' power
to serve. Before the Toleration Act, however, no person could plead the
sacramental disability resulting from the Corporation Act in bar of such
action as now existed, because such a disability was then a crime. No longer
was it a crime to be a dissenter; in fact it would be a crime for a dissenter
not to obey the dictates of his own conscience. Since neither statute law nor
common law made nonconformity a crime, punishment ought not to be
inflicted for mere difference of opinion with respect to modes of worship.
One judge, Baron Perrott, who concluded that Evans was not at liberty
and ought not to be allowed to object to the validity of his election on
account of not having taken the sacrament according to the rites of the
Church of England, had argued that the Toleration Act only amounted
to an exemption of Protestant Dissenters from the penalties of certain laws
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937
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which it mentioned and did not include the Corporation Act. To this Mansfield replied that the Toleration Act ought not to be interpreted so narrowly
and then he proceeded to relate the Toleration Act to the general legal position of the Protestant Dissenters. That act, he said, "renders that which was
illegal before, now legal; the Dissenters' way of worship is permitted and
allowed by this Act; it is not only exempted from punishment, but rendered
innocent and lawful; it is established: it is put under the protection, and is not
merely under the connivance, of the law. In case those who are appointed
by law to register Dissenting places of worship, refuse on any pretence to
do it, we must, upon application, send a Mandamus to compel them ....
Dissenters, within the description of the Toleration Act, are restored to
a legal consideration and capacity; and an hundred consequences will from
thence follow, which are not mentioned in the Act. For instance, previous
to the Toleration-act, it was unlawful to devise any legacy for the support of
Dissenting Congregations, or for the benefit of Dissenting Ministers; for the
Law knew no such assemblies, and no such persons; and such devise was
absolutely void, being left to what the Law called superstitious purposes.
But will it be said in any Court in England, that such a device is not a good
and valid one now? And yet there is nothing said of this in the Tolerationact. By that Act the Dissenters are freed, not only from the pains and
penalties of the Laws therein particularly specified, but from all ecclesiastical
censures, and from all penalty and punishment whatsoever on account of
their Nonconformity, which is allowed and protected by this act, and is
therefore in the eye of the law no longer a crime."
Turning to apply these principles to the case under dispute-and it may
be said that few men interpreted the Toleration Act so generously-Mansfield
insisted that Evans might plead his sacramental disability in bar of the
action without being considered a criminal. The maxim that a man shall
not be allowed to disable himself was held not to apply in this case, though
Perrott had used it, for no man could be denied the right to plead that he
was not fit and able. He might legally plead that he lacked the £15,000
necessary to qualify for the office of Sheriff, and, within the Toleration Act,
he might plead that he had not fulfilled the sacramental test, this being a
reasonable and a lawful excuse. It was not excusing one crime by another.
Furthermore, the right which the King had to the service of all his subjects
must be properly qualified. Natural or civil disabilities might excuse a man,
and in this case Evans was barred by a civil disability. He has shown that he
is a bona fide Dissenter within the description and the requirements of the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss1/9
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Toleration Act and his plea that he is disabled from holding office is a sound
and legal plea.
From this Mansfield turned to a discussion of religious liberty. "Conscience," he said, "is not controulable by human laws, nor amenable to
human tribunals. Persecution, or attempts to force conscience, will never
produce conviction; and are only calculated to make hypocrites, ormartyrs." The common law knew no prosecution for mere opinions, for
bare Nonconformity was no sin by common law and all positive penal laws
had been repealed by the Toleration Act. There was nothing "more unreasonable, more inconsistent with the rights of human nature, more contrary
to the spirit and precepts of the Christian Religion, more iniquitous and
unjust, more impolitic, than Persecution" which was "against Natural
Religion, Revealed Religion, and sound Policy." These principles he further
illustrated from the history of France, but he admitted that when the
Jesuits prepared to persecute the Huguenots they did not hit upon such an
"exquisite dilemna" as that in which the English Protestant Dissenters were
placed. The Jesuits merely repealed the Edict of Nantes. Englishmen had
passed a law to render Dissenters incapable of office and then had passed
another to punish them for not serving. This was as bad persecution as that
of Procrustes: "If they are too short, stretch them, if they are too long, lop
them."
The by-law came in for especial denunciation as having been made in
the face of the Corporation Act and the Toleration Act which were acts
of Parliament. The election of Evans was contrary to the express purpose
of this by-law in seeking to obtain "fit and able" persons, for he was incapable of serving. He like many of his fellow religionists was chosen not for
his services but for his fine. In opposition to that penalty, he has pleaded a
legal disability grounded on two acts of Parliament. "I am of the opinion
that his plea is good." The opinion was affirmed by the Lords, and the judgments against Evans were reversed.
The significance of this case can hardly be over-estimated for it ended
a practice which had been in vogue for a century. Thereafter, no Protestant
Dissenter could be punished twice for the same offense as had been the situation. If for no other reason, the Dissenters owed Mansfield a great debt of
gratitude. More than throwing his influence in favor of Evans, however, he
took the opportunity to define the legal position of the Dissenters and to
speak out boldly against persecution. But this case did not end his activity
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937
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and a few years later he was to remove another burden under which a certain
sect of nonconformists suffered because of their nonconformity.
In the case of Atcheson v. Everitt,24 which arose 14 years later, Mansfield was dealing with the matter of Quaker evidence. In an action of debt,
in which the plaintiff won the verdict, it had been moved on behalf of the
defendant that there might be a new trial because a Quaker had been
received as a witness on his affirmation; and it was objected, that this being
a criminal cause, his evidence ought not to have been received. Lord
Mansfield declared the question to be of very great importance, "both as
to all the Quakers in the Kingdom, and to the general administration of
justice." He wished that by the statute, 7 & 8 William III, c. 34, "the
affirmation of a Quaker had been put on the same footing as an oath, in
all cases whatsoever." Formerly, he said, the legislature had looked upon
Quakers as particularly obstinate and criminal offenders but "the more
generous and liberal notions of the present times" did not regard real
scruples as an offense. Even before the passage of the statute, Quakers
"were safe where the Attorney-General could controul; but they wanted
to be secure from the persecution of private individuals." However, Quakers
had not been admitted as witnesses in criminal causes. "The question therefore is, what the statute means by the words 'criminal causes'." Diligent
search has revealed that the Courts in late years have relaxed their former
severity; a wide variety of suits had been considered as civil.
The action in this case, however, was not only given "to recover a
penalty" but it was also attended with disabilities, and therefore partook
of the nature of a criminal cause. Moreover, the offense was both nalum
prohibitum,by statute, and indictable at common law. "Upon general principles, I think the affirmation of a Quaker ought to be admitted in all cases
...But how the law is in respect to this particular case I am at present
not at all decided in my opinion."
After Mr. Justice Aston had spoken in the same vein, the attorney for
the defendant set about proving that the present cause was criminal and
that therefore by statute and by precedent the Quaker's testimony was not
admissible. "And it matters not," he maintained, "whether the offense is
of the greatest or least magnitude: if the end of the action is merely
damages, a Quaker's affirmation is admissible: but wherever the end is

24. 1 Cowp. 382 (1776).
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punishment, as in this case, it is not." In rebuttal an attorney for the
plaintiff declared the cause to be civil on the basis of the form of proceeding.
The plaintiff in choosing to prosecute by action rather than by indictment
had proceeded civilly not criminally; the plea was nil debet, not that the
defendant was not guilty. He stated also that there were no authorities for
arguing that the testimony ought not to be received in a case like the one
in question.
Lord Mansfield in summing up and giving judgment took full advantage of the opportunity to reiterate his sympathy with toleration. "I think
it of the utmost importance," he said "that all the consequences of the Act
of Toleration should be pursued with the greatest liberality, in case of the
scrupulous consciences of Dissenters on the one hand; but so as those
scruples of conscience should not be prejudicial to the rest of the King's
subjects." He declared that the cases where the affirmation of Quakers had
been denied were founded upon the hasty decision in Hilton v. Byron;- and
little or no attention had been paid to the parliamentary statute itself.
Then, having discoursed upon the Quakers' unfortunate position during the
Restoration when their scruples were proved to be real, he reminded the
Court that a more liberal way of thinking had prevailed since the Revolution. "The principles of toleration were explained and justified in consequence of the writing of Mr. Locke, Lord Somers, and other great men of
those times," and the Toleration Act giving extensive relief to scrupulous
consciences was passed. Although this act and the later one touching
affirmation had paid especial attention to the Quakers, this sect had not
been admitted to full privileges. His own opinion-and other judges
agreed with him-was "that upon the principles of the common law, there
is no particular form essential to an oath to be taken by a witness: but
as the purpose of it is to bind his conscience, every man of every religion
should be bound by that form which he himself thinks will bind his conscience most." In substance an oath and an affirmation were the same
thing.
The act permitting affirmation in place of oath had been fought hard and
carried only by small majorities. It was highly probable that the exception

25. 3 Salk. 248 (1700). Mansfield here erred in stating this case to be cited
in Rex v. Bell, Andr. 200 (1738). In this latter case, the court held a Quaker's
affirmation not receivable in a criminal cause, although efforts were made to show
that this particular cause had started as a civil cause.
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as to criminal causes came in by way of amendment. Although in some ways
the position of the Quakers had been much improved, in other ways they
had suffered, for before the statute, "if a Quaker were indicted for a capital
offence, he might call Quakers as witnesses in his defence, and that without
oath . . . But now by stat. 1 Ann. st. 2, c. 9, sect. 3, all persons examined
in criminal cases must be examined on oath, both for and against the
Crown; therefore, if a Quaker be indicted, he cannot have the benefit of
Quaker testimony." This, however, he said was "an exception not to be
extended by equity."
Herewith Mansfield turned to the case in question: "Is the present a
criminal cause?" There was, he said, a well known distinction between
criminal prosecutions and civil actions, and "penal actions were never yet
put under the head of criminal law, or crimes." The intent of the legislature
was to except Quaker evidence in "causes technically criminal." A different
construction "would not only be injurious to Quakers, but prejudicial to the
rest of the King's subjects who may want their testimony." Furthermore,
Quakers as dissenters from the Church of England were guilty of no crime,
and they had been held good witnesses. Their excuse for refusing to take
oaths was a good excuse. "No authority whatever had been mentioned on the
other side, nor any case cited where it has been held that a penal action
is a criminal case." In conclusion, he admitted not the "least embarrassment"
in stating that upon a penal action a Quaker's evidence might be received
upon his affirmation. Therefore, he was of the opinion that "Mr. Justice
Nares did perfectly right in admitting this Quaker to be a witness upon his
affirmation; and consequently that the rule for a new trial should be discharged." With this ruling the three other judges concurred.
Thereafter Mansfield seems not to have been involved in disputes
affecting religion; indeed during his last years as Lord Chief Justice no cases
of this sort seem to have arisen. His influence, however, did not lapse.
Although the decisions in subsequent cases did not always favor the dissenters, the penalties for religious nonconformity were sharply limited and
the issues upon which Mansfield had passed judgment were not reversed.
Not infrequently his judgments in favor of the dissenters were quoted in their
defense in later years. More than any other one man, he was responsible
for the principle that religious nonconformity of itself was not a crime, and
he stated that principle when not only the bulk, but also the weight of legal
opinion favored the opposite doctrine. Parliamentary enactment in later
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss1/9
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years merely confirmed what the Courts under Mansfield's guidance had long
since decided.
The career of Lord Mansfield, then, as touched upon here, reveals the
utter inadequacy of such comprehensive catchwords as "liberal" and "conservative." Every man who is born into this world alive is not, the author
of Iolantke to the contrary, "a little liberal or little conservative." He is
rather a complicated mixture of both, in the same day. At the very time that
Mansfield was drawing upon himself the denunciations of American colonists
he was handing down decisions designed to relieve religious dissenters. In
fact, while a statute that was at least partly his child was being denounced
in the thirteen colonies for establishing what Samuel Adams called the
"religion of the Pope" in Canada, this same statute, the Quebec Act, was
paving the way by its religious enlightenment for the loyalty of Canada to
Great Britain. In view of this activity as well as in connection with his
reception of the law merchant, it is time that the political "reactionary"
gave way in part to the judicial and the religious "liberal." To have been
denounced in the halls of colonial legislatures for his political conservatism
and to have been attacked personally by a London mob which burnt his
house during the London riots because of his support of religious toleration,
and to have been denounced by Junius 26 because the Roman code, the
law of nations, and the opinion of foreign civilians were his "perpetual
theme" while he was never heard to mention Magna Carta or the Bill of
Rights "with approbation or respect," reveals clearly the truth of "Bozzy's"
statement that Mansfield was not a "mere lawyer." Since he was not, it is
2
time for others than lawyers to appreciate his statureY.

26. 1 LETTERS OF JuNIus (1890) 308; letter of November 14, 1770. For
Mansfield's position during the Gordon Riots, see J. P. DE CASTRO, THE GORDON
RIOTS (1926).

27. For some very suggestive comments, see J. S. Waterman, Mansfield and
Blackstone's Commentaries (1934) 1 CH. L. REv. 549.
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